Author Archives: Mark Friedman

If the response of our leaders to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates anything, it is the enduring truth and continuing relevance of the following observation made by the great mid-19th Century French liberal, Frederic Bastiat:

Socialism, like the ancient ideas from which it springs, confuses the distinction between government and society. As a result of this, every time we object to a thing being done by government, the socialists conclude that we object to its being done at all. We disapprove of state education. Then the socialists say that we are opposed to any education. We object to a state religion. Then the socialists say that we want no religion at all…It is as if the socialists were to accuse us of not wanting persons to eat because we do not want the state to raise grain. (The Law, 1850)

Here too, discourse on how to respond to this deadly virus has too often been cast in terms of those who want to “do something” and those who simply wish to let this contagion run its course. Or worse, a clash between those who truly care about their fellow citizens, and those whose only concern is filthy lucre.

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As previously promised, here is a link to Danny and my paper offering a limited defense of immigration restrictions, just published in Cosmos + Taxis, a peer-reviewed, open access journal. Set forth immediately below is a summary, after which I offer a few thoughts on what I learned from the obstacles we had to surmount in getting it published.

Abstract: Contemporary liberal theorists generally support open borders and some argue that liberalism is incompatible with substantive immigration control. We argue that it has not been shown that there is an inconsistency in the idea of a liberal state enforcing such controls and that it may be obligatory for a liberal state to impose substantive restrictions on immigration. The immigration control on which we focus is that concerning people from societies that resemble closed societies, particularly those in which Islamic fundamentalism is endemic. We suggest that, if the threat we envision is real, then a liberal state has a right to limit immigration from such societies.

I am pleased to announce Danny Frederick’s and my paper, “The Liberal Defense of Immigration Control,” has been accepted for publication in the peer-reviewed, open access journal, Cosmos + Taxis.  I will link to this journal when our paper becomes available.  As you may know from prior posts, and as reflected in our title, we argue there that the characteristic duty of a liberal state is to secure “the maximum freedom of each person that is compatible with the equal freedom of all persons,” and that this obligation may in the circumstances we hypothesize require restrictions on immigration.

Danny Frederick’s and my paper “The Liberal Defense of Immigration Control” is still wanting a publisher. That’s the bad news. However, the good news is that even so it was recently referenced and discussed in the online magazine Quillette, one of the leading forums for classical liberal views. Specifically, Sam Kiss (a just-minted academic philosopher) in his essay “Is Liberal Immigration Anti-Democratic?—A Reply to Gadi Taub,” writes the following:

Some accept a fiduciary argument that says we may reconcile liberal rights with restrictionism because one of these rights is the right to strong liberal institutions. Taub hints at this kind of justification when he criticizes immigration to Europe and Israel. The idea is that allowing immigration, particularly immigration from authoritarian, conservative societies, threatens liberal institutions in the long-term. To their credit, the main proponents of the fiduciary argument, Danny Frederick and Mark D. Friedman, admit the evidence they have for believing immigration would weaken liberal institutions is limited. Since immigration restrictions are stringent, extensive restrictions on citizens, the evidence would have to be decisive. This isn’t the only problem with the fiduciary argument. What if institutions only count as strong liberal institutions if they have opened their borders? The reply may be that some features of liberal institutions matter more than others: whatever rights immigration restrictions violate are less important than any they supposedly protect. As immigration restrictions are so similar to restrictions on certain rights almost all liberals accept are basic, we’d have to look to citizenship to explain things here too. And the explanation can’t be circular. 

   Naturally, I am delighted that the ideas that Danny and I have worked so hard to develop and articulate have received this recognition. I will in due course address the reservations Kiss expresses about the “fiduciary argument,” but since I find the exchange between Taub and Kiss quite thought provoking in its own right, I will enter this discussion in broader terms.

A recent family vacation to Washington, D.C. crystallized my thinking regarding the statues and other tributes erected in earlier times to honor figures now considered disreputable and worse. Like gazillions of other tourists, we visited many of the majestic monuments dedicated by Congress to former presidents and public figures, including Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, FDR, and MLK.  It did not escape my notice that all of these men have flaws, when seen through 21^st century eyes, not appreciably worse than exhibited by those Confederate generals, leaders, and veterans whose statues and memorials have been razed, hidden, or renamed by many of our cities, municipalities, and colleges/universities over the last few years. Should our presidential memorials be next in line?

In my Libertarian Philosophy in the Real World (pp.162-67) and in blog posts here and here, I have defended the idea that a liberal state may permissibly impose immigration controls if required to maintain the tolerant, pluralistic nature of its polity. In light of the intense controversy surrounding this issue both within libertarian circles and more broadly, I wished to address this topic in a more thorough, comprehensive way.

As described in an earlier post, I was fortunate to recruit my friend Danny Frederick as a co-author, and we recently completed a draft that satisfies us both. Its title is “The Liberal Defense of Immigration Control,” and here is the abstract:

Liberal theorists generally support open borders and some recent work has argued that liberalism is incompatible with substantive immigration control. We argue that it has not been shown that there is an inconsistency in the idea of a liberal state enforcing such controls and that it may be obligatory for a liberal state to impose substantive, though relatively minor, restrictions on immigration. The immigration control on which we focus is that concerning people from societies that resemble closed societies, particularly those in which Islamic fundamentalism is endemic. We suggest that, if the threat we envision is real, then a liberal state has a right to limit, though not to prohibit, immigration from such societies.

We are still looking for a journal, but have decided to limit our search to those that permit self-publication prior to submission. Here is a link to our paper. We anticipate that it will undergo further revisions as part of the peer-review process, and so welcome all critical questions and comments in the hope of improving our arguments.

It is fair to say that Nozick’s adaptation of Locke’s famous proviso regarding the just original appropriation of property serves as the linchpin of his “entitlement theory” of justice. By conditioning just acquisition on the satisfaction of certain criteria, Locke sought to show that the system of property rights he envisioned would not worsen the situation of non-appropriators. In an earlier post I explain that Nozick interpreted Locke’s construct to include a “historical shadow” following property from owner to owner, and show that this enables him to resolve what might otherwise be fatal objections to his view regarding the stringency of property rights.

The key insight is that Locke’s proviso regarding the original appropriation of property is grounded in the concern that such acquisition not violate any other party’s natural right of self-preservation.  Given this perspective, we need not resort to a particular, hypothetical welfare baselines to judge whether a system of capitalist property rights is worsening the plight of others.  Ultimately, any such baseline is arbitrary.  Rather, we should look to the proviso itself for guidance. Continue Reading »

An objection to libertarianism that comes up with surprising frequency is the question of roads and other infrastructure. Specifically, that without the use of state coercion, these vital projects won’t get built, and we’ll all suffer immensely. It’s a critique that is easy to dismiss: Okay, the state will supply military defense, law enforcement, and roads; deal?

But that’s a bit too quick. If a libertarian polity can only supply infrastructure by violating its own core principles, that’s a serious problem. Fortunately, this is not so. I briefly address this critique at the end of Chapter 4 of my Nozick’s Libertarian Project, which is excerpted below. In retrospect, I probably should have referenced here not only the potential “moral catastrophe” limitation of property rights (based on value pluralism), but also the restrictions imposed by Nozick’s adaptation of the Lockean proviso. Continue Reading »