Internal Migration and Open Borders

One of the common arguments heard in libertarian circles in favor of open borders is that it is impossible to distinguish, in any morally relevant way, between internal migration and the regulation of movement across international boundaries. To illustrate, assume that residents of Maryland, upon moving to Virginia, commit violent crimes at a much higher rate than the natives. We should, according to this reasoning, nevertheless condemn Virginia if it reacted by closing its borders. Thus, it is asserted that even if migrants were much more likely to commit serious crimes here than natives, this would still not justify immigration restrictions.

This argument trades on our unwillingness to punish or harm people based on what we think they might do. So, even at a great social cost, it seems that we should not limit the freedom of innocent Marylanders, even if many of their fellow residents commit a disproportionate number of major felonies in neighboring states. It is claimed, therefore, that since all human beings are endowed with natural rights, we should not limit immigration from Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, even if many of those admitted will commit horrific terrorist acts.

There is, however, an obvious and potentially important difference between Marylanders and Pakistanis; that is, the former are members of a community known as the United States, while the latter are not. Supreme political authority over this polity rests with the federal government, which asserts a monopoly of force over the territory of this state, and promulgates and enforces its laws throughout. In the typical case, membership in this community arises not a matter agreement or consent, but from the simple fact that a person is born here and remains.

Libertarians generally hold, correctly in my view, that most of the laws enacted by the federal government are unjust, and therefore citizens have no moral obligation to obey them, although it may be prudent to do so. On the other hand, citizens (and residents) are morally obligated to obey just laws because they have an independent duty to do so, including criminal laws against murder, rape, robbery, etc. The state is also on firm moral footing in enforcing the constitutional requirements of procedural due process and equal protection under the law. As argued elsewhere, a reasonably just state may even collect taxes from its citizens on a non-consensual basis when necessary to ensure the supply of a public good, like national defense, essential to the exercise of rational agency.

This brings us then to the question of open borders. Is it just for the US to restrict migration without giving each would-be immigrant procedural due process with respect to any threat they may pose? In other words, can the US limit or bar migration from certain countries if our government reasonably believes that the absence of such restrictions will materially degrade the rule of law here. I believe the answer is “yes,” because the excluded persons are not members of our community and thus not entitled to all of the rights enjoyed by those who are.

It will no doubt be objected here that the right of free movement is a natural right not bestowed by any state. This may be true, but the scope of an individual’s rights end where the rights of others begin. In this case, the right of US citizens to the rule of law.

It is plausible that would-be immigrants from certain Muslim-majority nations present the risk of future terrorism of a particularly pernicious kind[1], and any attempt to quantify such risk on an individual basis is inherently unreliable. Even if a dependable procedure could be constructed, would be prohibitively expensive.  Accordingly, under these circumstances the national government should prioritize the well-being of its members over that of non-members by limiting immigration.

This follows from the simple fact that the leaders of a polity have duties to its members over and above what they owe to others. These obligations arise from the fact that the state only functions because its citizens pay taxes, and its security is supplied by them serving in the armed forces and in federal law enforcement agencies. Moreover, immigrants wish to live here because our citizens have generally internalized those social and political norms that produce liberal democracy and economic opportunity, rather than the many shades of tyranny and dire poverty now on offer elsewhere.

Anyone who denies the existence of this special obligation must explain not just why it is wrong for the national government to favor American interests with respect to immigration, but in a whole range of other cases. For example, the federal government is morally obligated, on behalf of its citizens, to maintain a military apparatus sufficient to deter attacks on its territory and to otherwise defend their rights, including the prosecution of just wars. But, it is absurd to think that it has the same moral obligation with respect to the citizens of France, Belgium, Japan, etc.

Similarly, if, as in the Jim Crow South, an electoral majority oppresses the minority under color of law, the federal government is morally required to intervene. But, if the Sunni oppress the Shia in Saudi Arabia, we act or not entirely at our discretion.  For the same reason, if a natural disaster of epic proportions overwhelms the ability of (say) Alabama to render effective assistance to the victims, the federal government is duty-bound to respond, but aid to Bangladesh under similar circumstances would be supererogatory.

In short, the plain fact that the US government often fails to promote the rule of law does not relieve it of the obligation to do so with respect to immigration. Thus, the analogy to the travel rights of Marylanders is not persuasive.

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[1] See the sources cited in my Libertarian Philosophy in the Real World, pp. 164-6.