As used by libertarians and other critics of US foreign policy, “blowback” is the bad stuff that happens when we stray from a foreign policy of non-interventionism, the essence of which is that we defend our homeland, and observe a benign neutrality elsewhere. Blowback is frequently invoked as an explanation for the rise of ISIS and for recent terrorist acts committed here and in France.[1] Ron Paul, the former congressman and presidential candidate is certainly one of the most influential spokesman for this position. Accordingly, it may be an opportune time to examine the case he makes for it in his best-selling book, The Revolution: A Manifesto (2008), Chapter 2.
Paul notes there that in the Republican presidential debates he was accused of the sort of isolationism that led to the rise of Hitler and the horrors that came with him. He seeks to turn this charge against his critics by asserting that it was Wilson’s unwise decision to enter World War I that broke a military “stalemate” and “gave inadvertent impetus to Hitler’s politics of extreme nationalism, since the treaty it made possible helped catapult him into the limelight. Hitler might otherwise have remained a nobody” (p.25). In short, an activist foreign policy is the real danger.
There is more than one thing badly wrong with this line of thinking. Perhaps the most glaring is the assumption that we can and should judge the merits of Wilson’s decision to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Germany in April, 1917 based on Hitler’s rise 17 years later. I believe it extremely unlikely that even the most brilliant strategic thinker then alive could have foreseen this result. It is like criticizing a physician who saves a young child’s life because 17 years later he became a serial killer.
Moreover, why should we end our consideration of the consequences of our entry into the First World War with the horrors of WWII? If Wilson is to be blamed for this, why doesn’t he get credit for what followed? Namely, the greatest period of poverty reduction, medical progress, and peace ever experienced by humankind. And, how do we know that in the absence of WWII (as experienced) something far worse might not have occurred?
Instead of Paul’s approach, I contend that when it comes to international relations, we should ask our leaders to defend our rights, and to do so with due regard for the legitimate interests of all affected parties. Without rehearsing all the relevant facts and argument here, I believe that our entry into WWI can be defended under this standard.[2]
It must also be said that however Hitler came to power, in the 18 months preceding Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt pursued a distinctly interventionist policy in favor of the UK and against Germany and Japan.[3] This decision no doubt made our entry into WWII much more probable, yet it light of the imminent threat posed by the Nazis, it seems reasonable to count this as an example of successful foreign policy activism.
In ridiculing the idea that he is an “isolationist,” Paul proclaims that “I favor the very opposite of isolation: diplomacy, free trade, and freedom of travel.” (p.10). Well, I “favor” them too, but unlike Paul, I recognize that we generally undertake these activities as a matter of right, and thus may be morally entitled to defend them. So, for example, if (as in WWI) German submarines interfere with our mutually-beneficial trade with Great Britain, we may be justified in taking military action to protect it.
By the same token, if a dictator such as Saddam Hussein makes it impossible for us to carry out trade with willing Kuwaitis, or destroys our investments in that country, he owes us compensation or is legitimately subject to military retaliation. Similarly, when the Castro brothers prohibit Cubans from leaving the island to live here, this not only violates their rights, but the rights of their relatives who would gladly host and sponsor them. Of course, such violations do not by themselves justify the costs of war, but even absent an attack on the US, there may be occasions where military action of some sort is the only way to vindicate the rights of our citizens.
Paul correctly observes that, just as with domestic policy, foreign interventions often have unpredictable, harmful consequences, as we have seen in Iraq, and may be driven by irrational political motives. So, there is certainly something to be said for non-interventionism.
On the other hand, defenders of an activist foreign policy can point to seemingly successful counter-examples: WWII, the Cold War, the Korean War, and the first Gulf War, among others. Thus, blunders and blowback may be the unavoidable result of an interventionist foreign policy that, while costly, serves not only our interest, but the world’s.[4] I would not be so rash as to claim that this issue can be settled empirically, so I believe we are left with libertarian scholar Randy Barnett’s conclusion that “Devising a military defense strategy is a matter of judgment and prudence about which reasonable libertarians may differ greatly.”[5]
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[1] For example, here, here, and here. I hope in a future post to address these claims more directly.
[2] See, e.g. Alexandre DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 2nd ed. 1971), 440-62. It should probably be mentioned at this point that the Tsar had abdicated immediately prior to our entry, thereby effectively ending Russia’s participation in the conflict and allowing Germany and its allies to concentrate all their efforts against the West. This makes Paul’s claim of a “stalemate” highly problematic.
[3] DeConde, pp. 585-602.
[4] Fernando R. Teson, “Enabling Monsters: A Reply to Professor Miller,” Ethics and International Affairs, 25(2) (2011), pp. 165-82.
[5] Barnett, “Libertarians and the War” opinion column, WSJ, July 17, 2007.
