Classical Liberalism, R.I.P.

I am among the millions of Americans disgusted by the current state of our politics and the candidates now on offer by the two major parties. Their duplicity, grotesque character flaws, and destructive policy proposals are taken here as a given. What is less appreciated, I believe, is that their rise is symptomatic of a much deeper and more serious problem; that it, the death of classical liberalism in our polity. This two-part post will constitute a brief autopsy.

Broadly speaking, “liberalism” consists of a constellation of principles regarding the appropriate relationship between citizen and state. As described by political philosophers Gerald Gauss and Shane Courtland, chief among these are the view that humans are born “free and equal,” that “any limitation of this freedom and equality stands in need of justification,” and that “only a limited government can be justified; indeed, the basic task of government is to protect the equal liberty of citizens.”

Where today’s liberals depart from the classical tradition is their understanding of the meaning of “liberty,” and more specifically their disdain for property rights. As Gauss and Courtland explain, the latter “have insisted that an economic system based on private property is uniquely consistent with individual liberty, allowing each to live her life —including employing her labor and her capital — as she sees fit.” Moreover, classical liberals hold that private ownership has tremendous instrumental value because, “put most simply, individual freedom is severely threatened when the state has its grip firmly on both the political and economic levers of power.”[1] In contrast, modern liberals regard property as something that may readily be redistributed by the state in the cause of “social justice” and its use regulated to achieve other important purposes, such as universal health insurance coverage.

Our constitution reflects the classical liberal worldview in both its global architecture and its specific provisions. It sets forth a system of delegated (or enumerated) powers, under which the state is only permitted to legislate in those areas expressly sanctioned by the text. It enshrined a robust federalism that severely restricts the authority of the national government, which the founders regarded as the greatest threat to liberty, while delegating most legislative power to the various states. The framers further constrained the central government by a plethora of institutional checks and balances that are familiar to any political science major.

The model of government chosen by the founders was republican, as opposed to directly democratic, because they sought to ensure that their core ideological commitments would survive the reactionary impulses of any temporary majority.[2] These values were articulated in the Bill of Rights, and the super-majority provisions of Article V make certain that any amendments will require a virtual consensus of all affected constituencies.

In line with the thinking of Locke and other classical liberals, the founders were deeply concerned with economic liberty. As Madison wrote in 1792,

Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that alone is a just government which impartially secures to every man whatever is his own.[3]

Accordingly, beyond the safeguards inherent in federalism and the system of enumerated powers, the Bill of Rights included the Third, Fourth, and Fifth amendments, which expressly protect property. The founders no doubt also took comfort in the fact that at the time of ratification, as in the mother country, the various states conditioned the franchise on the possession of certain levels of wealth, in addition of course to limiting it to white males.[4]

With the hindsight afforded by some 230 years of moral progress, we now recognize that the founding fathers had terrible blind spots when it came to the moral status and treatment of African-Americans, indigenous peoples, women, and so on. However, such views were the received wisdom of their day, and not just here. Unfortunately, the gross injustices present at this nation’s creation were only recently ended and ameliorated, and their effects are still with us today.

Nevertheless, it is essential to distinguish between the soundness of moral principles in the abstract, and their application. I have defended elsewhere the ethical foundations of classical liberalism.[5]  Our constitution, with its commitment to natural rights and to the “consent of the governed,” was accurately seen by 18^th and 19^th century liberals as a momentous achievement. Sadly, while we now recognize that all human beings are born “free and equal,” we have, as described below, largely abandoned the institutional framework that accords them the deference due autonomous agents. Coercion, not liberty, is the watchword of the day.

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[1] Mark D. Friedman, Libertarian Philosophy in the Real World, p.36.

[2] See Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 1, “Of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people, commencing demagogues and ending tyrants.” On the fundamental difference between democracy and the rule of law, see this earlier post.

[3] James Madison, “Essay on Property,” March 29, 1792. See also Madison’s Federalist No. 10: “there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling by which they overburden the inferior number is a shilling saved to their own pockets.”

[4] As reflected in Madison’s comment in Federalist No. 10, colonial and early federalist leaders feared that unwise and unjust levies would be enacted if those voting for them were not also required to pay them. An analogous constraint still exists today at the local level, where certain property tax levies require a supermajority vote.

[5] See my Nozick’s Libertarian Project, especially chapters 1 and 2.