Is there anything intrinsically valuable about an equal, or at least more equal, distribution of wealth or other resources among members of a given community? In other words, are there any circumstances where it would be just to reduce the holdings of some persons simply to reduce the disparity between what they have and what others do? What has come to be known as the “leveling down” argument answers these questions in the negative.
It does so by means of a simple thought experiment. Imagine that a certain community consists of two groups, the As and the Bs. The As each have 300 units of wealth, while the Bs each have 100. If we could somehow reduce the wealth of each A to 100 units, without altering any other aspect of the situation, should we do so?
Since the As would now have substantially less, while the Bs would have no more, it seems obvious that this measure would harm some without benefiting others, and so should not be taken. The leveling down argument relies on the fact that it is impossible to point to a single case where we would act solely in the name of material equality, thereby showing that it has no intrinsic value. So, those who claim that there is something evil about inequality per se, are just flat wrong.
Note that the leveling down argument does not purport to show that the redistribution of resources is never justified. Redistribution does not count as leveling down because it involves more than simply reducing the holdings of some. And, it is not done solely to promote equality of material condition.
Thus, If it happens that the “Bs” in a particular community consist of persons who through no fault of their own are in desperate need, while the “As” are extremely wealthy, it would be just to take a little from the latter to ensure the survival of the former. But this redistribution is done to save the lives of the innocent, in the name of justice, not to promote equality as such.
Furthermore, the leveling down argument does not deny that greater equality might be instrumentally valuable, i.e. as a means of promoting some other good. Accordingly, if one were of the view that social harmony and cohesion is intrinsically valuable, it is plausible that a community with relatively equal holdings would score higher on this dimension than others. Thus, we might level down in order to promote this value. Of course, this notion does not relieve communitarians of the burden of establishing a moral foundation for their theory.
The force of the leveling down argument was challenged in the comments to a recent blog post at the BHL site. But these purported counterexamples fail. One commentator suggested that we would endorse the closure of a publicly-funded, racially segregated swimming pool. However, this would not count as an instance of leveling down. While the closure deprives whites of the use of the pool without giving blacks access, this step clearly achieves another good, i.e. establishing equal protection under the law, which itself is intrinsically valuable.
The leveling down argument lends support to the libertarian position that people have rights to their holdings, even if undeserved. Suppose the As are much richer than the Bs solely because they were born with greater natural intelligence and talent, which is entirely undeserved. However, they did not treat the Bs unfairly in any way, but owe their greater wealth entirely to the fact that they are able to charge more for their services in a free market. There seems to be no justification for reducing the wealth of the As in order to promote equality.
The leveling down argument has the implication that it is not enough, from the moral perspective, to condemn our society because of the riches of the “1%,” or because it fails to conform to some “ideal” pattern of holdings. Before we act, we need to understand why some are richer than others, and whether public policy designed to address this inequality will serve any useful purpose, or just make certain people less envious.
Edit to Add: In an earlier post I offered an explanation for egalitarianism’s popular appeal, in spite of its intellectual infirmity: http://naturalrightslibertarian.com/2012/04/equality-as-a-proxy-value/
I think the final clause should say: ‘or whether it would simply reduce inquality.’ The reason for the suggested change is that it could be said that equality has an instrumental value because it makes people less envious, which is an intrinsic good.
However, I am wary of reducing envy by appeasing it. If people are envious, they should change. So while I would say that reducing envy is good if it comes about by people freeing themselves of their envious dispositions, I would also say that reducing envy is bad if it is brought about by redistribution to appease the envious.
Hi Danny:
Thanks for the comment. I think we are in agreement. I certainly disapprove of envy, and didn’t mean to suggest otherwise. My last sentence was meant to contrast “serve any useful purpose” with “mak[ing] certain people less envious.” The former can be defended, i.e. saving innocent people from death or great suffering, while the latter is just pandering to the mob.
Okay!